Digital MileiEverything you need to know about Javier Milei.

Public Record

The numbers as reported — official statistics first, interpretations attributed. Every figure below comes from INDEC, the BCRA, the IMF, or cited reporting.

Inflation: 289% to 33.5%

Argentina’s 12-month inflation peaked at 289.4% in April 2024 (INDEC), after the December 2023 devaluation pushed monthly inflation to 25.5%. By August 2026, monthly inflation was 1.7% — the lowest in 14 months — with the annual rate at 33.5% and year-to-date inflation at 21.3%. The government’s 2027 budget projects 18% annual inflation; the IMF’s 2026 forecast was 30.4%.

Supporters’ reading: the fiscal anchor and end of money-printing broke the back of inflation — the central achievement of the presidency. Critics’ reading: disinflation came partly through recession and crushed demand, and monthly inflation rebounded early in 2026 (hitting 3.7% in March 2025) before falling again. Both attributions from Argentine press and analyst commentary.

The fiscal surplus

The government reported a financial fiscal surplus in 2024 — its first annual surplus in over a decade and a half, achieved through deep spending cuts (public works frozen, transfers to provinces slashed, subsidies cut). The administration treats the surplus as non-negotiable; critics argue it was achieved partly by delaying payments and cutting capital spending rather than structural reform.

Poverty: the spike and the partial retreat

Poverty (INDEC, share of people below the basic-basket line) swung violently: 52.9% in H1 2024 — the devaluation shock — falling to 28.2% in H2 2025, then rising again to 32.3% in H1 2026 as incomes lagged prices. Extreme poverty rose from 6.3% to 7.5% over the same half-year; 44.5% of children under 14 were classified as poor.

Supporters’ reading: the 2024 spike was the unavoidable cost of stabilizing; the subsequent halving proved the model. Critics’ reading (e.g., UCA’s Social Debt Observatory): job insecurity and import competition keep poverty structurally high, and the 2026 rebound shows the gains were fragile.

Employment and industry

Unemployment stood at 7.8% in Q1 2026 (INDEC), up from 7.5% in late 2025. Manufacturing output fell 4.9% year-on-year in July 2026 and had declined in 10 of the previous 12 months, per INDEC — a data point critics cite as evidence that the strong peso and open imports are hollowing out industry. The government points to record-level economic activity in Q1 2026 (central bank data) and improving formal indicators.

The peso and the cepo

After the December 2023 devaluation (official rate from ~366 to ~800 per dollar), the peso crawled until April 2025, when most currency controls were dismantled and the peso floated within a 1,000–1,400 per dollar band under the $20bn IMF program. The peso slid ~10% on day one. Some individual-purchase limits were partially reinstated later in 2025, per market reporting — the “cepo” was wounded, not fully buried.

Growth and the 2027 budget

The government’s September 2026 budget bill projects 4% GDP growth in 2027 (from an expected 3% in 2026), a $15bn+ trade surplus, and 18% inflation. It also proposes higher defense spending tied to the Malvinas/Falklands sovereignty claim — notable under an austerity government, per Reuters. An IMF review mission arrived in Buenos Aires the week of 21 September 2026 to examine fiscal performance and reserves.

The midterms’ economic verdict

The 26 October 2025 midterms — LLA ~40.8%, Peronists ~31.7%, turnout 67.9% — are read by supporters as popular ratification of the adjustment, and by critics as a vote against the Peronist past rather than for the pain. Either way, the result gave Milei the congressional third needed to defend vetoes and decrees through 2027.

What remains contested

Three debates have no settled answer as of September 2026: whether disinflation is durable or dependent on an overvalued peso and capital inflows; whether the fiscal surplus can survive without cutting investment and delaying payments; and whether dollarization — the founding promise — is dead or merely deferred. This site records each side’s claims with attribution and updates the figures as INDEC publishes them.

How to read this page. Figures are INDEC/IMF/BCRA unless noted. Interpretations are labeled as supporters' or critics' readings with the source of the reading. Figures the record doesn't support are omitted — see methodology.

Source notes